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Hazel: Student Cyber-Speech after Kowlaski v. Berkeley County Schools

STUDENT CYBER-SPEECH AFTER KOWALSKI v. BERKELEY COUNTY SCHOOLS

Is a webpage created off campus constitutionally protected student speech?
In 2007, a high school student brought a § 1983 suit against her school district
after she was suspended for creating a webpage that derided a fellow classmate. 1
The plaintiff argued that the suspension violated her constitutional rights of free
speech and due process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The
district court granted summary judgment to the school district, 3 and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that "the school was
authorized to discipline" the student, and that the school had not violated the
4
student's right to free speech and due process.
The Internet is inescapable. Social networking has become part of our social
culture. 5 Schools now face the difficulty of determining if and when speech that
is created entirely off-campus is constitutionally protected or punishable by
administration. In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals added a new element to the analysis of that question, and
school boards across the country should pay attention.
I.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINION

A three-judge panel consisting of Judge Niemeyer, Judge Duncan, and Judge
6
Agee affirmed the decision of the district court. Much of Judge Niemeyer's
opinion explained the reasoning behind the court's conclusion that the school
was authorized to discipline Kara for her off-campus speech.7 The remainder of
the opinion clarified the court's agreement that there was no due8 process
violation nor was there any evidence of infliction of emotional distress.
A.

Background

Kara Kowalski was a high school student at Musselman High School in
West Virginia.9 She was elected "%ueen of Charm" in her junior year and was a
member of the cheerleading squad.' She came home from school on December

I. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1095 (2012).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
See id. at 574, 576.
5.
Eric Edge & Jamie Bemheim, Social Media Explosion: Americans Are Redefining Their
Lives Online and Offline With Social Media Tools, PRNEwSWIRE, (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/social-media-explosion-americans-are-redefining-theirlives-online-and-offline-with-social-media-tools-70471552.html.
6.
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567.
7.
See id. at 570-75.
8.
See id. at 575-76.
9.
Id. at 567.
10. Id. at 569.
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1, 2005, and logged onto the social network site MySpace.ll While on the site,
she created a new webpage with the heading "S.A.S.H." and which stated "No
No Herpes, We don't want no herpes." 12 She claimed it was to make other
students aware of sexually transmitted diseases, and "S.A.S.H." stood for
"Students Against Sluts Herpes."' 13 Approximately 100 people, all Kara's
friends, were invited to join the page.' 4 The comments and postings by students
soon indicated that the page was not an informational site, but was created to
make fun of a fellow classmate named Shay.15
The first posting was a picture by Ray Parsons, another student at
Musselman High School. 16 The picture was of Ray and another student holding
their noses and displaying a sign reading "Shay Has Herpes."' 7 Kara responded
Ray
with a comment of approval, and other students soon joined her.
responded by posting two edited photographs of Shay. 9 In the first photograph,
Ray drew "red dots on Shay N.'s face to simulate herpes and added a sign near
her pelvic region, that read, 'Warning: Enter at your own risk."' 20 "In the second
photograph, he captioned Shay N.'s face with a sign that read, 'portrait of a
,1 1,,22
" screw
whore."' 21 Comments from other students soon followed, such as "1l,
23
her," "this is great," "your [sic] so awesome kara," and "Kara = My Hero.,
Shay's father called Ray a few hours after the webpage was created,
expressing his anger. 24 Ray called Kara, who tried to disable the webpage but
was unsuccessful.§5 The following day, Shay and her parents went to the school
and filed a harassment complaint. 26 Shay left with her parents and did not attend
27
school that day because she felt uncomfortable remaining in the school. The
eventually learned that Kara had
administration investigated the incident and
28
been the creator of the incendiary webpage.
The Student Handbook, which Kara received at the beginning of the school
year, included a "Harassment, Bullying, and Intimidation Policy" (Policy),

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
"Students
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.

28.

Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 568. The first student to join the group stated that the acronym stood for
Against Shay's Herpes." Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
"lol" is an abbreviation for "laugh out loud."
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
See id.
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which "prohibited 'any form of ... sexual ... harassment... or any bullying or

intimidation by any student... during any school-related activity or during any
education-sponsored event, whether in a building or other property owned,
use[d] or operated by the Berkeley Board of Education." '' 29 Bullying was
defined as:
[A]ny intentional gesture, or any intentional written, verbal or
physical act that
1. A reasonable person under the circumstances should know will
have the effect of:
a. Harming a student or staff member;
2. Is sufficiently inappropriate, severe, persistent, or pervasive that
it creates an intimidating,
threatening or abusive educational
30
environment for a student.

Violations of the Policy result in suspension; however, disciplinary actions could
be appealed.3 t
Kara was suspended from school for ten days and received a ninety-day
"social suspension." 32 Kara's father intervened and the administration reduced
the out-of-school suspension by half.33 In November 2007, Kara brought suit
against the Berkeley County School District and others involved in the decisionmaking process, alleging First Amendment free speech violations, Fifth
Amendment due process violations (which were later clarified as Fourteenth
Amendment due process violations), Eighth Amendment violations for cruel and
34
unusual punishment, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations.
Kara also alleged violations under the West Virginia Constitution and state law
claims of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress and sought
damages, a declaratory judgment that the policy at issue was unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad, and an injunction to clear her discipline record.35
11. DisTRICT COURT DECISION
The defendants' filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion for
summary judgment. 36 The district court dismissed the free speech and cruel and

29. Id. at 569 (alteration in original).
30. Id.
31. Id. This policy was also incorporated into the school's Student Code of Conduct (Code)
which Kara also received at the beginning of the school year. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 570.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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unusual punishment claims, though they revisited the free speech claim when
considering summary judgment.37 The district court granted summary judgment
to the defendants, explaining that Kara had notice and an opportunity to be heard
before she was suspended. 38 The court denied her equal protection claim,
infliction of emotional distress claim, and motion for reconsideration. 39
III. FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION
On appeal, Kara began her argument to the Fourth Circuit by claiming "that
the school administrators violated her free speech rights under the First
Amendment by punishing her for speech that occurred outside the school. She
argue[d] that because this case involved 'off-campus, non-school related speech,'
school administrators had no power to discipline her." 4 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has yet to address the boundaries of school discipline as it is applied to this
type of speech. Therefore, the defendants' argument relied on other circuit
courts' decisions, such as the Second Circuit's decision in Doninger v. Niehoff:4'
"a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off
school grounds, when this conduct 'would foreseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment,' at least when it was similarly
foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus." 42 The
issue for the court became a balancing of the school's interest in maintaining
order and protecting students from harassment with Kara's right to create a
demeaning webpage, and whether Kara could reasonably foresee that her offcampus speech might reach inside the school's authority to discipline.43
The court began its analysis by elucidating the seminal case dealing with
disruption of schools: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School

District,4 where students wore armbands in protest of the Vietnam War.45 The
United States Supreme Court held that students are free to express their opinions,
as long as that expression does not substantially interfere with the daily operation

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 570-71.
41. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
42. Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)). This
foreseeability element has been used for off-campus behavior by students that is considered
threatening. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 426 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2000) (Friedman, J., dissenting) ("[T]he proper test for determining whether Student's web site
constitutes a 'true threat' is whether a reasonable person in Student's position would foresee that
viewers of the web site would interpret it as a serious expression of intent to harm."); see also,
Benjamin L. Ellison, Note, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with OnCampus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 809, 825-27 (2010) (discussing the critical treatment of
the "reasonable foreseeability" test by some courts).
43. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 571.
44. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
45. Id. at 504.
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of the school or with other students' rights, 46 because students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.",47 This "substantial disruption" test establishes that student speech may be
punished if it "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others. ' 48 The court also cited to other cases that
indicate that speech offending a school's character development message is not
protected. In Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,49 the Supreme Court saw
a "marked distinction between the political 'message' of [the student speech] in
Tinker" and the student speech in Fraser, which involved a student campaign
speech filled with sexual innuendo.50 The Court held that schools could punish
"vulgar and lewd [on campus] speech" if it was contrary to the school's basic
52
mission. 511 The Supreme Court held similarly in Morse v. Frederick. Here, a
banner posted by a student away from school property was "reasonably viewed
as promoting illegal drug use," and adverse to school policy.53 Therefore, the
student's speech was not constitutionally protected. 54
The Fourth Circuit focused specifically on the Tinker disruption standard.55
The court reasoned that "the language of Tinker supports the conclusion that
public schools have a 'compelling interest' in regulating speech that interferes
with or disrupts the work and discipline of the school, including discipline for
student harassment and bullying., 56 Bullyin especially bullying on the
Internet, is a major concern across the country. 7 In Lowery v. Euverard,58 the
Sixth Circuit held that schools have an affirmative duty to protect students from
bullying and harassment, 59 and the Fourth Circuit agreed with that reasoning,
stating that "administrators must be able to prevent and punish harassment and
6°
bullying in order to provide a safe school environment conducive to learning.
The court made clear that Kara's speech was substantially disruptive under the
Tinker standard, and that it was reasonable for her to expect that the speech

46. Seeid. at514.
47. Id. at 506.
48. Id.at 513.
49. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
50. Id. at 677-78, 680.
51. Id. at 685-86.
52. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
53. See id. at 409-10.
54. Id. at 410.
55. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 504 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012).
56. Id.
57. See generally, Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick, Bullying as True Drama, N.Y. TIMES Sept.
22, 2011, at A35, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/opinion/why-cyberbullyingrhetoric-misses-the-mark.html.
58. 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
59. Id. at 596 ("School officials have an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful
effects of disruptions, but to prevent them from happening in the first place.").
60. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572.
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would reach the school and affect the environment of the school. 61 They
reasoned that because she invited primarily Mussleman High School students to
join the page and encouraged targeted, harassing, and vulgar postings, her
actions fell under the school's regulation authority. 62 Therefore, there was no
First Amendment violation because the school was authorized to discipline Kara
for speech that interfered with the workings of the school.63
Kara also claimed that her due process rights were violated because she
lacked sufficient notice that her speech could be regulated by the school, and
because she did not have an opportunity to be heard. 64 The court held that the
Policy and Code presented Kara with adequate notice that "a student will not
bully/intimidate or harass another student." The fact that the Policy limits the
prohibition to bullying "during any school-related activity or during any schoolsponsored event" does not prevent the court from construing the anti-bullying

policy broadly. 66 The court reasoned that the Policy and Code applied whenever
"conduct could adversely affect the school environment." 67 Because it was
reasonably foreseeable that the webpage would disrupt the school, the court held
that Kara was on notice that her conduct could be regulated. 68 The court also
held that the requirements of Goss v. Lopez69 were met, and Kara's due process
rights were not violated. 70 Finally, the court upheld the district court's dismissal
of the state law claim of emotional distress, since Kara did not prove the
elements required under West Virginia law.7 l
The court ended the unanimous opinion with a strong scolding of Kara
Kowalski, Ray Parsons, and the other participants' behavior, calling the webpage
"particularly mean-spirited and hateful' 7 Though the other participants may
not have as much responsibility as Kara and Ray, the court still stated that their
"conduct was indisputably harassing and bullying." 73 The court reiterated that
Kara knew that the webpage would reach the school atmosphere, and that she

61. Id.at574.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 575.
65. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. See id. at 575-76.
67. Id. at 575.
68. Id. at 575-76.
69. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (seminal case defining administrative "notice and hearing" required
under due process).
70. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 576 (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 581).
In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being
given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first
be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 582.
71. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 576.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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cannot expect her activities to be insulated by claiming constitutional
protection. The court lamented that Kara chose to sue the school rather than
learn from the experience: "she yet fails to see that such harassment and bullying
is inappropriate and hurtful and must be taken seriously by school administrators
in order to preserve an appropriate pedagogical environment."75 The court
concluded by holding that as long as there is a sufficient nexus between speech
76
and the school environment, administrators may regulate student speech.
IV. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Kara Kowalski filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court
on October 11, 201 1.77 The Court denied the petition on January 17, 2012.78
V. CONCLUSION

The lower courts had already begun to add significant factors to the Tinker
test in response to the growing use of the Internet. One factor is a "sufficient
nexus approach," examining whether there is a significant relation between the
speech and the school. 79 If there is no such nexus, then more stringent First
Amendment principles would apply to the speech.80 Another factor added by the
Second Circuit is that there must be a foreseeable risk that there will be a
substantial disruption and that it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will
arrive on campus.8s In the Kowalski opinion, the Fourth Circuit joined the
Second Circuit in adding a foreseeability element to the analysis. 82 However, the
Fourth Circuit did not address both prongs of the Doninger analysis. The court
stated that, "We are confident that Kowalski's speech caused the interference
and disruption described in Tinker."83 The court did not analyze the specific
consequences of having reasonable foreseeability that the speech would reach
campus. The court held that the school was authorized to discipline Kara
because the speech actually caused disruption, and because it was reasonably
foreseeable that it would reach campus.84 However, it remains unclear whether

74. Id.
75. Id. at 577.
76. Id.
77. Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565, petitionfor certfiled, (U.S. Oct. 11, 2011) (No. 11-461), 2011
WL 4874091.
78. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012).
79. See Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public
School Jurisdictionover Students' Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1583 (2009).
80. Id.
81. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)).
82. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.
83. Id. at 572.
84. Id. at 574.
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speech that is foreseeably disruptive and that has not yet reached campus but is
likely to do so85is subject to regulation, but the Fourth Circuit did not discount
that possibility.
Notably, the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion in a case very
similar to Kowalski. In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School
District,86 a student created a webpage that poked fun of the principal. 87 The
webpage was accessed and viewed on campus by students who had been asked
to become "friends" of the webpage.88 During a school investigation about the
webpage, a student admitted he had created it and verbally apologized to the
principal. 89 The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the school did
not establish a sufficient nexus between a substantial disruption and the student's
speech. 9° In fact, the school conceded that there was no substantial disruption at
all, only that it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach
campus. 9' The court held that because there was no substantial disruption, the
92
"District [was] not empowered to punish his out of school expressive conduct."
Certiorari was denied for Layschock as well.93 Francisco M. Negr6n Jr.,

general counsel of the National School Boards Association, was frustrated at the
denials: "We've missed an opportunity to really clarify for school districts what
their responsibility and authority is." 94 His frustration is joined by other
commentators, two of which wrote a review illustrating the lack of consensus
among the circuits: "[T]his review adds a voice to the chorus of interested parties
insisting that the Supreme Court step in and articulate a realistic roadmap for
educators. 95 The petition for certiorari for Kowalski stated that:
[T]he lack of clear guidance from this Court, and the conflicting
decisions in the lower courts, make it impossible for students, parents,
teachers, and school administrators to understand the scope of student

85. See id.
86. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
87. Id. at 207.
88. Id. at 208-09. Students also accessed Kara's website via school computers. Kowalski,
652 F.3d at 568.
89. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 209.
90. Id. at216.
91. Id.
92. Id. at219.
93. Layshock ex. rel Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 132 S. Ct. 1097, 1097 (2012).
94. Supreme Court declines to hear student Internet speech cases, NBSA LEGAL CLIPS (Jan.
19, 2012), http://Ilegalclips.nsba.org/?p=1 1474.
95. Philip T. K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, A Need to Sharpen the First Amendment Contours
of Off-Campus Student Speech, 273 ED. LAW REP. 21, 22 (2011).
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"that students
speech rights-in effect, leaving the public to conclude
96
have a right to speak ...except when they don't."
One area that may make a difference in a student's right to speak is the
object of their speech. In the Fourth Circuit case, the target of the speech was a
fellow student, so bullying regulation
was implicated. In the Third Circuit, a
97
principal was the brunt of the joke.
However, the most important element in the Layshock and Kowalski
opinions is in the substantial disruption and foreseeablility argument. In both
opinions, the courts based their final conclusion on whether or not a substantial
disruption of the school environment had occurred. In Layshock, the school
district avoids the "actual" school disruption argument. The school district
argued that following Tinker, a student can be punished because it was
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach campus. 98 The court,
however, disagreed. The Third Circuit held that because there was no actual
disruption, the student could not be punished, rejecting the notion that
foreseeability can be the only element considered. 99 This is actually contrary to
the holding in Tinker, in which the Court states that speech or behavior only
needs to "reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities" for regulation to be
appropriate. too
The Fourth Circuit in Kowalski, on the other hand, did not dismiss the
possibility that the foreseeablility argument may be enough in future cases. The
court emphasized that "even though Kowalski was not physically at the school
when she operated her computer to create the webpage... it was foreseeable in
this case that Kowalski's conduct would reach the school ...[and] it [in fact did]
create[] a reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption there."' 10 1 The court
based its conclusion on the actual interference: "At bottom, we conclude that the
school was authorized to discipline Kowalski because her speech interfered with
the work and discipline of the school."' 102 The courts seem to agree that if a

96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Kowalski v. Berkeley County Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012) (No. 11-461), 2011 WL 4874091, at *31 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418
(2007)).
97. Adding more confusion is the Pennsylvania state court opinion in J.S. ex rel. H.S. There,
the court held that a student could be disciplined for off-campus internet speech that targeted a
teacher because there was a substantial school disruption that resulted. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. 757 A.2d 412, 421-22 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
98. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.
99. Id. at219.
100. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (emphasis added).
"[R]equiring school officials to wait until disruption actually occur[s] before investigating would
cripple the officials' ability to maintain order." Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir.
2007).
101. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1095 (2012).
102. Id.
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substantial disruption is actually caused by the internet speech, the student may
be punished. Disagreement abounds as to whether Internet-based speech,
created off campus, can be regulated if there is only a reasonable foreseeability
as to whether the speech will cause a substantial disruption on campus. Some
commentators suggest a higher evidentiary standard for reasonable
foreseeability:
School officials must be able to point to specific and particularized
facts that support why they foresee a substantial disruption... not mere
apprehension of a possible disruption.... The response should be to
prevent an imminent foreseeable substantial disruption or interferencenot after03the fact because a disruption could possibly have occurred, but
did not.'
Another commentator is concerned that the lack of consensus risks chilling
student speech, stating "[b]ecause the internet blurs the line between students'
school and home lives, there is a significant risk that lower protections for oncampus speech might seep into all areas of students' lives, with significant
potential consequences for their First Amendment rights."104
The Fourth Circuit seems to have adopted an "either/or" analysis, which is
consistent with the holding in Tinker. Until the Supreme Court decides to
address the issue, the standard of foreseeability in student Internet-speech cases
remains unresolved. Until then, the "reasonably foreseeable" or "substantial
disruption" tests based on Tinker, and endorsed by the Fourth Circuit, yields to
school administrators' greater authority to combat harassment and bullying in the
form of off-campus Internet speech.
MargaretA. Hazel

103. Nancy Willard, School Response to Cyberbullying and Sexting: The Legal Challenges,
2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 75, 108.
104. FirstAmendment-Student Speech-Third Circuit Applies Tinker to Off-Campus Student

Speech.-J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), 125 HARv. L. REv. 1064, 1068 (2012).
Because the determination of a substantial disruption depends almost entirely on the facts
of the case at issue, students will often have almost no basis on which to predict whether
their speech would fall within Tinker's ambit. These concerns apply a fortiori to cases
where the school official need only show a reasonable fear of substantial disruption,
rather than its actual occurrence.
Id. at 1070.
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